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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Robert Joseph Frauenberger appeals from the district court's judgment of
conviction. A jury convicted Mr. Frauenberger of three counts of lewd conduct and one
count of delivery of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen.

The Third

Amended Criminal Information listed Bonnie Noe as the alleged minor victim involved in
each count. However, no evidence at trial was presented concerning the alleged victim,
thirteen year-old "Bonnie Noe." On appeal, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to
provide substantial competent evidence to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Mr. Frauenberger engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with "Bonnie Noe" or
provided her with marijuana.
Alternatively, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to allow the jury to make findings on crimes related to B.H. as he had never
been charges with said crimes. At trial, evidence was presented which showed that
Mr. Frauenberger may have committed crimes, similar to those charged, involving
another minor, B.H.

Although the information charged Mr. Frauenberger with

committing these crimes against "Bonnie Noe," the jury was instructed that it must find
Mr. Frauenberger guilty if they believed he committed these crimes against B.H.
Because Mr. Frauenberger had never been charged with committing lewd conduct
against B.H. or providing marijuana to B.H., he asserts that the district court did not
have jurisdiction to allow the jury to make a finding on Mr. Frauenberger's guilt as to
those charges which had never been filed.

1

Alternatively, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court created an
impermissible variance when it failed to limit the elements instruction for each of the
charges to those overt acts alleged in the Information, specifically that the alleged victim
was Bonnie Noe, not B.H. as the jury was instructed.
Additionally, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct which deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see
that Mr. Frauenberger had a fair trial by engaging in vouching, presenting improper
evidence, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury. Mr. Frauenberger
contends that the misconduct committed in his case was either preserved by objection
or constituted fundamental error and that the errors are not harmless.

Moreover,

Mr. Frauenberger asserts the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant his
motion for a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct.
Further, Mr. Frauenberger contends the district court abused its discretion when
it sentenced him to an excessive sentence without considering the mitigating factors
that exist in his case.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On

December

14,

2010,

a

Criminal

Information

was

filed

charging

Mr. Frauenberger with three counts lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen
and two counts of delivery of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen.
(R., pp.18-21.) The charges specifically listed that the illegal contact had occurred with

thirteen year-old Bonnie Noe. (R., pp.18-21.) The Information was amended several
times, but the actual crimes charged and victim listed did not change. (R., pp.37-40, 4649, 75-77.)

Mr. Frauenberger entered a not guilty plea to each of the charges.

(R., p.22.)
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At the initial trial, after selecting a jury, the district court declared a mistrial
because each side had not been afforded the proper number of preemptory challenges.
(R., pp.51-52.) The trial was rescheduled. (R., pp.51-52.)

On April 26, 2011, the new

trial began. (R., pp.112-118.)
At the beginning of the trial, the jury was read the information and was told that
the charges involved thirteen-year-old Bonnie Noe. (Tr.4/26/11, p.11, L.24 - p.14, L.9.) 1
Then, during voir dire, the district court told the jury the alleged victim was B.H.2
(TrA/26/11, p.34, Ls.14-15.)
The State's first witness was B.H. (Tr., p.6, Ls.3-17.) B.H. provided testimony
that she had engaged in sexual activity with Mr. Frauenberger when she was thirteen on
three occasions, and that he had provided her with marijuana on one occasion. (See
generally Tr., p.7, L.3 - p.76, L.16.) During cross examination, B.H. was asked if she is
"Bonnie No[e]"; she responded, "I guess, yeah." (Tr., p.83, Ls.23-24.) Isabella Maw
testified that she was sneaking out with B.H. and verified that the two had contact with
Mr. Frauenberger on one of the nights that the alleged lewd conduct occurred. (See
generally Tr., p.131, L.15 - p.160, L.3.)

Paul Nigg testified that he had seen

Mr. Frauenberger with B.H. on a couple of occasions, did not see any illegal activities
involving B.H., but did tease Mr. Frauenberger about rumors that Mr. Frauenberger had
sexual contact with B.H. (See general/yTr., p.160, L.11 - p.214, L.9.)
The State's final witness was Officer Smith.

Officer Smith investigated the

charges and discussed his interviews with both B.H. and Mr. Frauenberger.

(See

For ease of citation, the original trial transcript will be cited to as Tr., all other
transcripts will also include a relevant date.
2 Although the district court used B.H.'s entire name throughout proceedings, she will be
referenced only as B.H. on appeal. It is important to note that B.H.'s first name is not
Bonnie, nor is it related to or similar to the name Bonnie.
1

3

generally Tr., p.215, L.3 - p.264, L.21.)

During Officer Smith's testimony, the State

began asking questions about the number of thirteen year-olds that Officer Smith had
interviewed and whether or not S.H.'s behavior was "usual."
Defense counsel objected several times.

(Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.)

(Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.)
As the questioning

continued, defense counsel objected on the grounds that the testimony was invading
the province of the jury by vouching for the credibility of the S.H. (Tr., p.234, Ls.5-10.)
The questioning then continued, but in a more general nature regarding Officer Smith's
interviews with children in the past.

(Tr., p.234, L.12 - p.238, L.3.) The State then

asked how similar S.H.'s interview was to other interviews Officer Smith had completed.
(Tr., p.238, LsA-10.) Officer Smith answered:
I was just wanting to - I guess I was wanting to make sure we weren't
getting into a state where we were too comfortable with each other, and I
wanted to communicate with [S.H.] that I wanted to ensure that she was
telling me the truth. And I felt that we were at a very comfortable point in
the interview where she was becoming very comfortable in talking to me. I
didn't believe, at that point, that she was lying necessarily.
(Tr., p.238, Ls.11-19.) Defense counsel objected and the district court struck the last
sentence from the record and told the jury to not "consider the witness' belief as to
whether the victim was telling the truth or not." (Tr., p.238, Ls.20-25.)
Later, after discussing Officer Smith's interview with Mr. Frauenberger, the
prosecution asked Officer Smith if Mr. Frauenberger "indicate[d] to you whether or not
he had ever been placed on probation for having been possessing marijuana."
(Tr., p.247, Ls.10-12.)

Office Smith answered, "Yes, he did."

(Tr., p.247, L.13.)

Defense counsel again objected and asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury.
(Tr., p.247, Ls.14-23.)
Defense counsel then made a motion for mistrial based upon two grounds: that
the State improperly brought up, for the first time, Mr. Frauenberger's criminal history
4

when the conviction was not a felony or related to truthfulness, and that after several
objections the State continued with a line of questioning that resulted in Officer Smith
vouching for the credibility of B.H.

(Tr., p.248, L.9 - p.249, L.12.) The prosecution

agreed that it was improper to have asked about probation; that the prosecutor was
"misreading my questions"; that a jury instruction would address the issue; and that
Officer Smith was not bolstering B.H.'s credibility, but was responding to an inference
defense counsel made during cross-examination about Officer Smith shaking his head.
(Tr., p.249, L.15 - p.250, L.21.)

Defense counsel responded that he agreed limited

questioning was appropriate; that he did not object to the initial questioning about the
area he touched on in cross-examination, but that the questioning went too far; the
judge recognized that, struck the statement, told the jury to disregard it, but that it is
difficult for a jury to do, and now that the jury has heard two totally improper things; that
a jury instruction is not sufficient; and that a "mistrial with prejudice is the appropriate
remedy here." (Tr., p.250, L.23 - p.251, L.19.)
The district court had the court reporter read the question again.

(Tr., p.251,

Ls.20-25.) The district court then held that although the questioning was improper, both
eliciting vouching testimony and eliciting testimony about Mr. Frauenberger being on
probation, that because no answer was giving to the probation question and
Mr. Frauenberger's use of marijuana had been addressed, that the motion for mistrial
would be denied.

(Tr., p.252, L.7 - p.254, L.5.)

The district court then struck the

question and told the jury not to consider it. (Tr., p.254, Ls.16-19.)
The State rested. (Tr., p.264, L.25 - p.265, L.1.) Following a Rule 29 motion,
the district court dismissed Count IV, delivering marijuana to a person under the age of
eighteen. (Tr., p.266, L.13 - p.267, L.18.)

5

Defense counsel then called Mr. Frauenberger who testified that he did not have
sexual contact with S.H., did not provide her with marijuana, and discussed the fact that

(See generally Tr., p.269, L.10 -

he was on probation for possession of marijuana.
p.327, L.10.)

Defense counsel specifically noted that since the probation had been

brought up by the State that they were now going to
Mr. Frauenberger's testimony.

(Tr., p.290, Ls.17-21.)

address

it though

The defense then rested.

(Tr., p.327, Ls.22-23.)
The State presented a very brief rebuttal.

(Tr., p.370, L.17 - p.387, L.12.)

During rebuttal, the State called Aletia Straub, Mr. Frauenberger's probation officer.
(Tr., p.377, L.10 - p.378, L.3.) During her testimony she mentioned that in August of
2009, there had been a probation violation hearing. (Tr., p.381, Ls.3-11.)
During closing argument, the prosecution continued to commit misconduct by
vouching for the alleged victim and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury.
(Tr.4/28/11, p.186, L.6 - p.198, L.18.)
The jury was instructed that in order to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of counts one
and two it must find that:
3.

the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed manual-genital
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.],3

4.

[B.H.] was a child under the age of sixteen (16) years of age ...

(R., pp.89-90.) On count three the jury was instructed:

3

3.

The defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed oral-genital
contact upon or with the body of [B. H.],

4.

[B.H.] was a child under sixteen (16) years of age ...

B.H.'s full name was used in the jury instructions.

6

(Augmentation, Jury Instruction Number 10l On count five, the jury was instructed
that, "3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger delivered any amount of marijuana
to [S.H.], a person who was under 18 years old ... " (R., p.91.) B.H.'s full name, not
Bonnie Noe, is used in several other jury instructions, but the name Bonnie Noe does
not appear in any instructions. (R., pp.80-105.)
After deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all of the remaining charges.
(R., pp.107-108.)

Later, defense counsel filed a Motion for New Trial based upon the prosecutorial
misconduct that occurred during the trial. (R., pp.119-123.) The motion was denied.
(R., pp.133-134.)

The case proceeded to sentencing.

The State recommended a

unified sentence of eleven years, with five years fixed, for each charge, to be run
concurrently.

(Tr., p.411, L.20 - p.412, L.1.)

Defense counsel requested that the

district court withhold judgment and place Mr. Frauenberger on probation. (Tr., p.405,
Ls.12-14.)

Additionally, the presentence investigator recommended that the district

court retain jurisdiction.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.12.)

Mr. Frauenberger was sentenced to unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed,
for the lewd conduct charges, and four years, with one year fixed, for the delivery of
marijuana charge, to be served concurrently. (Augmentation: Judgment of Conviction Order of Commitment ***Re-Corrected***.) Mr. Frauenberger filed a Notice of Appeal
timely from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.139-141.)

Mr. Frauenberger filed a Motion to Augment on May 3, 2012. It has not been ruled on
upon the filing of this Appellant's Brief.

4
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ISSUES
1.

Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support the jury's verdicts
finding Mr. Frauenberger guilty of lewd conduct or delivery of marijuana to
Bonnie Noe?

2.

Were the charges for which Mr. Frauenberger was ultimately convicted, related
to criminal conduct involving a minor victim B.H., charges for which no
information or indictment had been filed and for which subject matter jurisdiction
had not been conferred?

3.

Did the district court create a fatal variance from the State's information when it
instructed the jury that the charges involved the minor victim S.H. instead of
Bonnie Noe as alleged in the information?

4.

Did the State violate Mr. Frauenberger's right to a fair trial by committing
prosecutorial misconduct?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon
Mr. Frauenberger, unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, for the
lewd conduct charges, and four years, with one year fixed, for the delivery of
marijuana charge, to be served concurrently?

8

ARGUMENT
I.

The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury'S Verdicts
Finding Mr. Frauenberger Guilty Of Lewd Conduct Or Delivery Of Marijuana To Bonnie
Noe

A.

Introduction
A jury convicted Mr. Frauenberger of three counts of lewd conduct and one count

of delivery of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen. The Third Amended
Criminal Information listed Bonnie Noe as the alleged minor victim involved in each
count.

However, no evidence as trial was presented concerning the alleged victim,

thirteen year-old Bonnie Noe. As such, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to
provide substantial competent evidence to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Mr. Frauenberger engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with Bonnie Noe or provided
her with marijuana.
B.

The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The JUry'S Verdicts
Finding Mr. Frauenberger Guilty Of Lewd Conduct Or Delivery Of Marijuana To
Bonnie Noe
A Judgment of Conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, must be overturned on

appeal where there lacks substantial competent evidence upon which a reasonable trier
of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Corlez, 135 Idaho
561,562 (2001); State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210,219 (Ct. App. 1998). "For evidence to
be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the
same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v.
Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 (1996)).
9

On appellate review, the significance of the evidence will not be reweighed as it
relates to specific elements of the crime, instead the Court will examine the supporting
evidence. State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 172, 174 (Ct. App. 1999). When reviewing the
evidence for sufficiency to support the jury verdict, the reviewing Court will review all of
the trial evidence, including testimony presented by the defendant. State v. Brown, 131
Idaho 61, 71 (Ct. App. 1998). This Court does not substitute its view of the evidence for
that of the jury with regard to matters of the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to
attach to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998). Additionally, the
Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict. State v. Glass,
139 Idaho 815,818 (2004).
Mr. Frauenberger was charged, by information, with three counts of lewd conduct
with a child under the age of sixteen and two counts of delivery of marijuana to a person
under the age of eighteen. (R., pp.18-21.) The charges specifically listed that the illegal
contact had occurred with thirteen year-old "Bonnie Noe."

(R., pp.18-21.)

The

Information was amended several times, but the crimes charged and listed victim did
not change.

(R., pp.37-40, 46-49, 75-77.) At the beginning of the trial, the jury was

read the information and was told that the charges involved thirteen-year-old "Bonnie
Noe." (Tr.4/26/11, p.11, L.24 - p.14, L.9.) However, no evidence was ever provided as
to Bonnie Noe's involvement with Mr. Frauenberger.
In this case, the State's evidence was as follows: The State's first witness was
S.H.

(Tr., p.6, Ls.3-17.)

B.H. provided testimony that she had engaged in sexual

activity with Mr. Frauenberger when she was thirteen on three occasions and that he
had provided her with marijuana on one occasion. (See generally Tr., p.7, L.3 - p.76,
10

L.16.)

During cross examination, B.H. was asked if she is "Bonnie No[e)"; she

responded, "I guess, yeah." (Tr., p.83, Ls.23-24.) Isabella Maw testified that she was
sneaking out with B.H. and verified that the two had contact with Mr. Frauenberger on
one of the nights that the alleged lewd conduct occurred.

(See generally Tr., p.131,

L.15 - p.160, L.3.) Paul Nigg testified that he had seen Mr. Frauenberger with B.H. on
a couple of occasions, did not see any illegal activities involving B.H., but did tease
Mr. Frauenberger about rumors that Mr. Frauenberger had sexual contact with B.H.
(See generally Tr., p.160, L.11 - p.214, L.9.)

The State's final witness was Officer

Smith. Officer Smith investigated the charges and discussed his interviews with both
B.H. and Mr. Frauenberger. (See generally Tr., p.215, L.3 - p.264, L.21.)
B.H.'s response to defense counsel's question that she guessed she was Bonnie
Noe is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State intended to use
Bonnie Noe as an alias for B.H. or to create a fictitious name for B.H. to protect her
identity. Traditionally, a child's initials are used instead of their full name to protect the
identity of the child. I.R.C.P.3(c)(1)(b). Because no testimony, which could satisfy the
reasonable doubt standard, was offered to the jury explaining to them that Bonnie Noe
was somehow B.H., they were left to presume that Bonnie Noe was not B.H. The State
failed to present any evidence regarding Bonnie Noe at trial.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970);
see also State v. Gittens, 129 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1996). There was no evidence,
much less substantial and competent evidence, presented that proved, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that B.H. was Bonnie Noe or that Mr. Frauenberger had any sexual
11

contact or provided marijuana to Bonnie Noe.

Because this showing was essential in

order to establish the State's charges beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no
evidence that would support a finding of guilt on any of the charges and the convictions
must be overturned.
II.

The Charges For Which Mr. Frauenberger Was Ultimately Convicted, Related To
Criminal Conduct Involving A Minor Victim B.H., Were Charges For Which No
Information Or Indictment Had Been Filed And For Which Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Had Not Been Conferred

A.

Introduction
Mr. Frauenberger was charged with three counts of lewd conduct and one count

of delivery of marijuana to a minor, all charges specifically noting that Bonnie Noe was
the alleged victim. No evidence was presented at trial that Bonnie Noe was a victim.
However, evidence was presented at trial which showed that Mr. Frauenberger may
have committed similar crimes involving another minor, B.H. Although the information
charged Mr. Frauenberger with committing these crimes against Bonnie Noe, the jury
was instructed that it must find Mr. Frauenberger guilty if they believed he has
committed these crimes against B.H.

Because Mr. Frauenberger had never been

charged with committing lewd conduct against B.H. or providing marijuana to B.H., the
district court did not have jurisdiction to aI/ow the jury to make a finding on
Mr. Frauenberger's guilt as to those charges that had never been filed.
B.

The Charges For Which Mr. Frauenberger Was Ultimately Convicted, Related To
Criminal Conduct Involving A Minor Victim B.H., Were Charges For Which No
Information Or Indictment Had Been Filed And For Which Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Had Not Been Conferred
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law, over which the appellate

courts exercise free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004). In a criminal
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case, the filing of an information alleging that an offense was committed within the State
of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction.

Id. at 757-58.

Because the information

provides subject matter jurisdiction to the district court, the district court's jurisdictional
power depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge.
Id. at 758. Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of law and is

legally sufficient is also a question of law subject to free review. Id.
A challenge to the jurisdictional efficiency of a charging information is never
waived and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. State v.
Cook, 143 Idaho 323, 326 (Ct. App. 2006); Jones, 140 Idaho at 758. When the

information's jurisdictional sufficiency is challenged after trial, it will be upheld unless it
is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge the
offense for which the defendant was convicted. Jones, 140 Idaho at 759; State v.
Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287 (Ct.App.1991). A reviewing court has considerable leeway

to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the information. Jones, 140
Idaho at 759; Robran, 119 Idaho at 287. In short, when considering a post-trial
challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the information, a reviewing court need only
determine that, at a minimum, the information contains a statement of the territorial
jurisdiction of the court below and a citation to the applicable section of the Idaho Code.
Cook, 143 Idaho at 326; State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622 (2005).

Mr. Frauenberger does not challenge that the information is defective.

He

asserts that he was properly tried for the crimes involving Bonnie Noe, but that sufficient
information was not provided for the jury to return guilty verdicts on those charges. See
section I above. Mr. Frauenberger instead and alternatively asserts that he had never
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been charged for crimes associated with an alleged victim named B.H. Therefore, there
was no jurisdiction for the district court to instruct the jury on crimes related to B.H.
In the case at hand, Mr. Frauenberger was charged, by information, with three
counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen and two counts of delivery
of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen.

(R., pp.18-21.)

The charges

specifically listed that the illegal contact had occurred with thirteen year-old "Bonnie
Noe." (R., pp.18-21.) At the beginning of the trial, the jury was read the information and
was told that the charges involved thirteen-year-old "Bonnie Noe." (Tr.4/26/11, p.11,
L.24 - p.14, L.9.) However, after the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that in
order to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of counts one and two it must find that:
3.

the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed manual-genital
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.],

4.

[B.H.] was a child under the age of sixteen (16) years of age ...

(R., pp.89-90.) On count three the jury was instructed:
3.

The defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed oral-genital
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.],

4.

[B.H.] was a child under sixteen (16) years of age ...

(Augmentation, Jury Instruction Number 10.) On count five, the jury was instructed that,
"3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger delivered any amount of marijuana to
[B.H.], a person who was under 18 years old ... " (R., p.91.) B.H.'s full name, not
Bonnie Noe, is used in several other jury instructions, but the name Bonnie Noe does
not appear in any instructions. (R., pp.80-105.)
A legally sufficient information must adequately set forth the nature and
circumstances of the offense charged to enable a person of ordinary understanding to
know what is intended in the charge. State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 633-34 (Ct. App.
14

1982); I.C. § 19-1409.

Further, the information should reflect the name of the

prosecutrix as such data is an essential part of the charge against a defendant for lewd
and lascivious conduct. State v. Thurlow, 85 Idaho 96, 103 (1962). In this case, there
is no information charging Mr. Frauenberger with any criminal actions involving B.H.
The information filed conferred jurisdiction only for the crimes charged involving Bonnie
Noe.
Therefore, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that while many of the elements would be
the same for the crimes for which he was charged and the crimes for which the jury was
asked to determine guilt, they are not the charges for which jurisdiction had been
conferred.

Because there was no jurisdiction for the district court to allow the jury to

make a determination as to Mr. Frauenberger's potential guilt associated with his
possible actions involving B.H., he asserts that his convictions must be vacated.

III.
The District Court Created A Fatal Variance From The State's Information When It
Instructed The Jury That The Charges Involved The Minor Victim B.H.! Instead Of
Bonnie Noe As Alleged In The Information
A.

Introduction
The district court created an impermissible variance when it failed to limit the

element instruction for each of the charges to those overt acts alleged in the
Information; specifically, that the alleged victim was Bonnie Noe, not B.H. as the jury
was instructed. The jury was allowed to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of three counts of
lewd conduct and one count of delivery of marijuana to a minor if it believed that the
alleged victim was B.H.

However, Mr. Frauenberger was charged with these same

offenses with a different minor, Bonnie Noe.
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B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a variance exists between the charging document and the evidence

presented at trial or between the information and the jury instructions is a question of
law over which an appellate court exercises free review. See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho
327, 330 (Ct. App. 2001). Although Mr. Frauenberger's counsel did not object to the
variances during the trial proceedings, this Court can review these errors for the first
time on appeal as fundamental error. In order to meet Idaho's fundamental error
standard:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning. .. that
it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The defendant must prove that the error was

not harmless by demonstrating "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
outcome of the trial." Id.
The error in the instant case is fundamental under Perry.

Mr. Frauenberger is

challenging a variance from the charging document which he alleges is fatal, i.e., a
violation of his right to due process that leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy.
See State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 47 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a variance

between from the charging document requires reversal when it deprives a defendant of
his substantial rights by violating the defendant's right to fair notice or leaving him open
to the risk of double jeopardy); State v. Cariaga, 95 Idaho 900,903-04 (1974) ("Because
the variance between the complaint and conviction denies the appellant due process of
law, she has not waived her right to object even though no objection has been
16

previously made.").

As such, Mr. Frauenberger is challenging a violation of his

constitutional rights.

Next, the error in this case is clear and obvious. In the instant

case, there is nothing indicating that defense counsel for Mr. Frauenberger intentionally
waived the variance and there is no reasonable tactical decision for failing to object to
the jury instructions varying from the charging document. Finally, Mr. Frauenberger's
substantial rights were affected as he is left open to the risk of double jeopardy
because, although the jury found him guilty of committing crimes associated with B.H.,
the information charges him with crimes associated with Bonnie Noe, thereby allowing
the State to potentially recharge him in a case listing the victim as B.H., subjecting him
to punishment for crimes for which he has already been punished.
C.

The District Court Created A Fatal Variance From The State's Information When
It Instructed The Jury That The Charges Involved The Minor Victim B.H.! Instead
Of Bonnie Noe As Alleged In The Information
"A criminal defendant is entitled to be apprised by the charging instrument not

only of the name of the offense charged but in general terms of the manner in which it is
alleged to have been committed." Brazil, 136 Idaho at 331 (citing I.C. §§ 19-1303,1409 (charging instrument must contain a statement of the acts constituting the
offense); I.C. § 19-1411 (charging instrument must be direct and certain as it regards
the particular circumstances of the offense charged); State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240,
246-47 (1937) (holding that an information must not only state the name of the alleged
crime but also inform the accused as to how it is claimed the accused committed the
offense.)).
A determination of whether a variance is fatal depends on whether or not the
basic functions of the pleading requirement have been met. As stated by the United
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States Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935), overruled on

other grounds by Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960):
The true inquiry ... is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but
whether there has been such a variance as to 'affect the substantial rights'
of the accused. The general rule that allegations and proof must
correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused
shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may
be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the
evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against
another prosecution for the same offense.
Therefore, a variance is held to require reversal of the conviction only when it deprives
the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy.

State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,417-18 (1985); Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330-31; State v.
Love, 76 Idaho 378,381(1955).5 However,
commentators have argued that the double jeopardy element is no longer
as vital a function of the pleading document as it once was since now
transcripts of the trial itself are available and more readily relied on to
establish what was before the court and jury and ultimately resolved by
them, as a bar to future prosecutions. 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern
Criminal Procedure, § 19.2(b), at 446 (1984), citing State v. Smith, 102
Idaho 108, 626 P.2d 206 (1981). "Accordingly, it is argued, 'protection
against successive prosecutions for the same offense ... [should] not
require of an accusation any more completeness than the notice function
demands.'" 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra, § 19.2(b) at 446, quoting Scott,
Fairness in the Accusation of Crime, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 509, 516-17 (1957).

Windsor, 110 Idaho at 418, n.1.
In the case at hand, Mr. Frauenberger was charged, by information, with three
counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen and two counts of delivery
of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen.

(R., pp.18-21.)

The charges

5 There are two types of variances: variances involving a difference between the
allegations in the charging instrument and the proof adduced at trial, and variances
involving a difference between the allegations in the charging instrument and the jury
instructions. State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2004). The analysis for
both types of variances is the same. Compare, e.g., Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, with
Love, 76 Idaho at 381.
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specifically listed that the illegal contact had occurred with thirteen year-old "Bonnie
Noe." (R., pp.18-21.) At the beginning of the trial, the jury was read the information and
was told that the charges involved thirteen-year-old "Bonnie Noe." (TrAI26/11, p.11,
L.24 - p.14, L.9.) However, after the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that in
order to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of counts one and two it must find that:
3.

the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed manual-genital
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.],

4.

[B.H.] was a child under the age of sixteen (16) years of age ...

(R., pp.89-90.) On count three the jury was instructed:
3.

The defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed oral-genital
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.],

4.

[B.H.] was a child under sixteen (16) years of age ...

(Augmentation, Jury Instruction Number 10.) On count five, the jury was instructed that,
"3.

the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger delivered any amount of marijuana to

[B.H.], a person who was under 18 years old ... " (R., p.91.)

B.H.'s full name, not

Bonnie Noe, is used in several other jury instructions, but the name Bonnie Noe does
not appear in any instructions. (R., pp.80-105.)
These instructions clearly do not describe the same crimes for which
Mr. Frauenberger was charged.

Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the switching of the

alleged victim's name from Bonnie Noe to B.H. created a fatal variance, violating
Mr. Frauenberger's right to due process and potentially subjecting him to additional
punishment. While Mr. Frauenberger does not assert a variance in regards to a lack of
notice, he does acknowledge that his variance claim may need to be addressed under
the notice standard. A review of whether the defendant was deprived of his or her right
to fair notice requires the court to determine whether the record suggests the possibility
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that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his
or her defense. Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330. Certainly, not being correctly informed of the
identity of the alleged victim would mislead a defendant and greatly affect the defense
presented.

Similarly, Mr. Frauenberger's substantial rights were affected as he is left

open to the risk of double jeopardy because although the jury found him guilty of
committing crimes associated with B.H. the information charges him with crimes
associated with Bonnie Noe and the State may potentially recharge him in a case listing
the victim as B.H., subjecting him to punishment for crimes for which he has already
been punished.
Therefore, because the district court created a variance and thereby violated
Mr. Frauenberger's right to due process and leaves him open to the risk of double
jeopardy, and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test,
Mr. Frauenberger's conviction must be vacated.
IV.
The State Violated Mr. Frauenberger's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing
Prosecutorial Misconduct
U[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of
'due process.'" Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, U[n]o
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V.

Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, U[n]o state

shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that,
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"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
10. CONST. art. I, § 13.

Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.

Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so

unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's
right to a fair trial.

The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged

Id.

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

The aim of due process is not the

punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial
to the accused. Id.
A.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Frauenberger's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in

constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1,2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not
be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v.
Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). For alleged errors for which there was a

timely objection, Mr. Frauenberger only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at
which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).

On appeal,

Mr. Frauenberger also raises instances of un-objected to misconduct. Because these
claims of error are raised for the first time on appeal, Mr. Frauenberger must establish
that the errors are reviewable as "fundamental error." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court
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recently revisited fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for
fundamental error:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
Id. (footnote omitted).

Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first

show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights," and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear,
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry
test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless, i.e., that there is a
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228.
B.

The State Violated Mr. Frauenberger's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing
Prosecutorial Misconduct
1.

Misconduct For Which There Was An Objection:
The Prosecution
Committed Misconduct By Eliciting Vouching Testimony From Officer
Smith, And By Asking Officer Smith Whether Mr. Frauenberger Was On
Probation For Possessing Marijuana
a.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The
Province Of The Jury By Eliciting Vouching Testimony From Officer
Smith

The prosecution committed misconduct in this case by asking a witness to testify
about the credibility of the alleged victim, a clear and obvious error. "Statements by a
witness as to whether another witness is telling the truth are prohibited."

State v.

Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d
336 (8 th Cir. 1986); State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 P.2d 48 (1990); State v.
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Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986); State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652,
694, P.2d 1117 (1985); State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983)).
Testimony from lay witnesses regarding issues of credibility is inadmissible.

See

Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24,31 (Ct. App. 1994).
During the State's examination of Officer Smith, the State began asking
questions about the number of thirteen year-olds that Officer Smith had interviewed and
whether or not B.H.'s behavior was "usual."
objected several times.

(Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.)

Defense counsel

(Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.) As the questioning continued, defense

counsel objected on the grounds that the testimony was invading the province of the
jury by vouching for the credibility of the B.H. (Tr., p.234, Ls.5-10.) The questioning
then continued, but in a more general nature regarding Officer Smith's interviews with
children in the past. (Tr., p.234, L.12 - p.238, L.3.) The State then asked how similar
B.H.'s interview was to other interviews Officer Smith had completed. (Tr., p.238, Ls.410.) Officer Smith answered:
I was just wanting to - I guess I was wanting to make sure we weren't
getting into a state where we were too comfortable with each other, and I
wanted to communicate with [B.H.] that I wanted to ensure that she was
telling me the truth. And I felt that we were at a very comfortable point in
the interview where she was becoming very comfortable in talking to me. I
didn't believe, at that point, that she was lying necessarily.
(Tr., p.238, Ls.11-19 (emphasis added).)

Defense counsel objected and the district

court struck the last sentence from the record and told the jury to not "consider the
witness' belief as to whether the victim was telling the truth or not." (Tr., p.238, LS.2025.)
The State violated Mr. Frauenberger's right to a jury trial when the prosecutor
attempted to encroach upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility
determinations. The Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho stated over one-hundred
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years ago, that a question calling "for the opinion of one witness as to the truthfulness of
another ... is clearly an invasion of the province of the jury, who are the judges of the
credibility of witnesses." Perry, 150 Idaho at 229 (quoting People v. Barnes, 2 Idaho
148, 150 (1886)).

This prohibition is not simply a court rule by which trials are

conducted, but instead, is rooted in one's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that,
In a jury trial, it is for the jury to determine the credibility of a witness, not
another witness. See State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 P.2d 48
(1990). See also United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701 (10th Cir.) cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 829, 102 S.Ct. 122,70 L.Ed.2d 104 (1981), reh. denied,
454 U.S. 1094, 102 S.Ct. 662, 70 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981); United States v.
Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100
S.Ct. 179, 62 L.Ed.2d 116 (1979); State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 211 (Utah
App.1991); State v. Ross, 152 Vt. 462, 568 A.2d 335 (1989); State v.
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo.1984). Statements by a witness as to
whether another witness is telling the truth are prohibited. See United
States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.1986); Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799
P.2d 48; State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986); State v.
Fitzgerald, 39 Wash.App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985); State v. Keen, 309
N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983).
Johnson, 119 Idaho at 857.
"The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment. .. includes the right
to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of the testimony.''' State v. Elmore, 154
Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825,
838,889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51, 60 P. 403
(1900)). Generally, no witness may offer testimony in the form of an opinion regarding
the guilt or veracity of the defendant; such testimony is unfairly prejudicial to the
defendant "because it 'invad[es] the exclusive province of the [jury].'"

State v.

Demery, 144 Wash.2d 753, 759, 30 P.3d 1278, 1282 (WA 2001) (quoting City of
Seattle v. Heatley, 70 Wash.App. 573, 577, 854 P.2d 658 (1993) (citing State v. Black,
109 Wash.2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12 (1987))).
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Admitting impermissible opinion

testimony regarding the defendant's guilt may be reversible error because admitting
such evidence "violates [the defendant's] constitutional right to a jury trial, including the
independent determination of the facts by the jury." Id. (quoting State v. Carlin, 40
Wash.App. 698, 701, 700 P.2d 323 (1985), overruled on other grounds by City of
Seattle v. Heatley, 70 Wash.App. 573, 854 P.2d 658 (1993)).
The questioning of Officer Smith by the prosecution was clearly designed to
provide Officer Smith an opportunity to share his opinion regarding B.H.'s truthfulness.
Such opinion testimony is clearly inadmissible. The district court correctly recognized
that the statement was misconduct. And although a limiting instruction was given, this
statement, that a trained police officer believed B.H., is the type of evidence that would
seriously impede a jury's ability to independently judge credibility. As such, a limiting
instruction was insufficient and a new trial should have been ordered.
b.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Asking Officer Smith
Whether Mr. Frauenberger Was On Probation For Possessing
Marijuana

After discussing Officer Smith's interview with Mr. Frauenberger, the prosecution
asked Officer Smith if Mr. Frauenberger "indicate[d] to you whether or not he had ever
been placed on probation for having been possessing marijuana." (Tr., p.247, LS.1012.) Office Smith answered, "Yes, he did." (Tr., p.247, L 13.) Defense counsel again
objected and asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury. (Tr., p.247, Ls.14-23.)
Later, the prosecution admitted that it was improper to have asked about probation, that
the prosecutor was "misreading my questions." (Tr., p.449, Ls.15-22.)
Recently the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to
the jury." State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). They
should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass
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upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress
upon the rights of the accused." /d.
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,469 (2007).

The above question is clearly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
Information that Mr. Frauenberger had a criminal record, especially related to
possessing marijuana, when a marijuana charge is at issue, is highly prejudicial. Again,
this is the type of information that may interfere with the jury's ability to make an
impartial decision about whether or not Mr. Frauenberger is innocent of the charges
against him. As such, he asserts the proper remedy, was to grant a new trial.
c.

The District Court Abused Its
Mr. Frauenberger's Motion For Mistrial

Discretion

By

Denying

Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for a mistrial.

A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which

provides that, "ra] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there
occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or
outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant
of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a); State v. Cane/o, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996). The
decision whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the district court
and, absent an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal.

/d.; State v.

Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 818 (Ct. App. 1993). The Supreme Court has held that the

question on review is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion
under the circumstances existing when the motion was made; but, whether the event or
events which brought about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when
viewed in the context of the entire record. /d.
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In cases where juries have been exposed to extraneous information or other
improper influences, the Idaho Supreme Court has followed an approach similar to the
approach adopted by the federal courts and declined to require a determination of
actual prejudice. Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1989). These
courts have generally held that if the trial judge finds that the extraneous information
reasonably could have resulted in prejudice a new trial should be ordered. Id.
Consequently, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the proper standard is
whether prejudice reasonably could have occurred, rather than, whether prejudice
actually has occurred. Id. The Court's holding relies on two considerations:
First, the extreme rigor of an actual prejudice test would severely restrict
the availability of relief for misconduct, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the jury system and eroding the fundamental principle that a
"verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the triaL" United
States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Second, Rule 606(b), !.R.E., precludes a full
inquiry into actual prejudice. As mentioned above, Rule 606(b) bars jurors
from giving evidence concerning their mental processes. Because jurors
cannot be questioned as to whether they were in fact prejudiced by
extraneous information, the trial judge must determine whether the
information reasonably could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in
light of all the events and the evidence at trial.
Id.

Therefore, it is sufficient for the judge to merely determine whether prejudice

reasonably could have occurred. Id. at 839. In making this determination, courts must
give due regard to "the policy of assuring that jury verdicts are based upon the evidence
at trial, not upon extraneous information or improper influences." Id.
Further, a trial court's declaration of mistrial and dismissal of charges against a
defendant because of prosecutorial misconduct during trial prevents retrial.

State v.

Stevens, 126 Idaho 822,830 (1995).

In the case at hand, following improper vouching questions and an improper
question about Mr. Frauenberger being on probation, defense counsel made a motion
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for mistrial based upon two grounds: that the State improperly brought up, for the first
time, Mr. Frauenberger's criminal history when the conviction was not a felony or related
to truthfulness, and that after several objections the State continued with a line of
questioning that resulted in Officer Smith vouching for the credibility of S.H. (Tr., p.248,
L.9 - p.249, L.12.) The prosecution agreed that it was improper to have asked about
probation; that she was "misreading my questions"; that a jury instruction would address
the issue; and that Officer Smith was not bolstering S.H.'s credibility, but was
responding to an inference defense counsel made during cross-examination about
Officer Smith shaking his head.

(Tr., p.249, L.15 - p.250, L.21.)

Defense counsel

responded that he agreed limited questioning was appropriate; that he did not object to
the initial questioning about the area he touched on in cross-examination, but that the
questioning went too far; the judge recognized that, struck the statement, told the jury to
disregard it, but that it is difficult for a jury to do, and now that they have heard two
totally improper things; that a jury instruction is not sufficient; and that a "mistrial with
prejudice is the appropriate remedy here." (Tr., p.250, L.23 - p.251, L.19.)
The district court had the court reporter read the question again.

(Tr., p.251,

Ls.20-25.) The district court then held that:
Mr. Archibald raises two issues for grounds for the mistrial. The
first surrounds the witness' statement that he didn't believe that she was
not telling the truth. And that particular testimony came at a time, as
counsel points out, where there were some objections to that particular
line of questioning. The Court had given some guidance as to the
demeanor of the witness. The witness had talked about the experience
that he had had in interviewing children and the differences between the
kinds of responses you would expect between adults and children. The
Court felt that that line of questioning was appropriate and had given
admonitions not to vouch for the credibility.
At the time the statement was made by the witness that he didn't
believe that at that time she was not telling the truth, the Court - I don't
know if it was by objection or quickly perceiving that issue, did give a
28

limiting instruction and not just sustained the objection but quickly asked
the jury not to consider that. So the Court is satisfied that the appropriate
remedy was undertaken with regard to that issue.
The referencing by the prosecutor of probation is a more difficult
question for the Court. I think the Court perceived that at the same time
that Mr. Archibald did. And the good news with regards, I think, to this
particular issue is that there was not an answer provided, and I think had
there been, that would have been more aggravating and more difficult for
the Court to deny the motion for mistrial.
I would note that the witness did testify regarding the statement that
the defendant had made that he had been smoking marijuana since he
was 15 years old. That evidence came in without any sort of objection,
and so I think that needs to be stated in the context of this objection, and
so what the Court intends on doing is giving a limiting instruction to the
jury again not to consider the previous question.
And, with that, this Court will deny defense's motion for the mistrial
on those two grounds. I think it's recognized by the prosecutor that that
was not an appropriate question and, again, I believe that the jury has
been introduced to the marijuana issue. It's one of the counts that has
been charged. The defendant has made some statement, whether you
call them admissions or not, surrounding that marijuana mitigates the
prejudice that the jury or that the defendant would experience as a result
of the jury just hearing the question by the prosecutor.
(Tr., p.252, L.7 - p.254, L.5.) The district court then struck the question and told the jury
not to consider it. (Tr., p.254, Ls.16-19.)
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
recognize that the extraneous information to which the jury was exposed could have
reasonably resulted in prejudice. Arguments regarding the vouching testimony provided
by Officer Smith and that such testimony is misconduct can be found above and are
incorporated by reference. He asserts that a limiting instruction is insufficient and that
the proper remedy was for the district court to grant a mistrial because of the danger of
improper influence.
Further, contrary to the district court's findings, the record reflects that the jury
heard Officer Smith answer the question affirmatively regarding Mr. Frauenberger's
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probation. (Tr., p.247, Ls.10-13.) As such, the district court's analysis is flawed. The
district court acknowledged that if there had been an answer the prejudice would be
greater. Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the jury hearing information not only that he had
used marijuana in the past, but had been criminally punished, created a great risk that
prejudice could have occurred.
Additionally, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that providing the jury with information
that he was on probation for possessing marijuana is comparable evaluating the need
for a bifurcated trial in felony driving under the influence cases. The Idaho Supreme
Court has held, in determining the need for bifurcated trials for felony driving under the
influence charges, that "[t]he possibility of prejudice against defendant resulting from
evidence or knowledge of prior crimes outweighs any policy argument regarding the
complication of trial proceedings." State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766, 768 (1975). In so
finding, the Wiggins Court quoted State ex rei. Edelstein v. Huneke, 249 P. 784
(Wash.1926): "It seems too plain for argument that to place before a jury the charge in
an indictment, and to offer evidence on trial as a part of the state's case that the
defendant has previously been convicted of one or more offenses is to run a great risk
of creating a prejudice in the minds of the jury that no instruction of the court can wholly
erase." Id.
The information regarding Officer Smith's opinion of B.H.'s veracity and
Mr. Frauenberger's past criminal conviction, even with the benefit of a limiting
instruction, could have reasonably resulted in prejudice to Mr. Frauenberger and,
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ultimately, deprived him of his right to a fair trial. 6 As such, Mr. Frauenberger asserts
that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
Mr. Frauenberger contends that this error was not harmless. Because there was
a timely objection, Mr. Frauenberger only has the duty to prove that an error occurred,
"at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot show
the error was harmless in this case.
2.

Misconduct For Which There Was No Objection:
The Prosecution
Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The Jury'S Function To
Make Credibility Determinations, And By Appealing To The Passions And
Prejudices Of The Jury

Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the
trier of fact in a criminal case."

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007)

(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose "is to enlighten
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence."

Id. (quoting

State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,450 (Ct. App. 1991)). "Both sides have traditionally

Mr. Frauenberger felt that he must take the stand and discuss the fact that he was on
probation as a result of the improper questioning, despite the limiting instruction.
Defense counsel specifically noted that since the probation had been brought up by the
State that they were now going to address it though Mr. Frauenberger's testimony.
(Tr., p.290, Ls.17-21.) Defense counsel further explained the perceived need for this
testimony at the hearing on the Motion for New Trial:
6

... when the issue of the probation came up, it - that did, that did put us
in an impossible position because not the Court - now the jurors had
heard it. .. I had to talk to my client and his father about it, about - do we
proceed? Do - does Joey take the stand? Do we address this probation
issue? How, how do we address that? And, and, and a criminal defendant
shouldn't have to be in that position, should have to focus his defense on,
on improper questioning of the prosecuting attorney. And so, and so it
was, it was just a difficult situation.
(Tr.6/15/11, p.5, L.21 - p.6, L.8.)
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been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom."

/d. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)).

However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those
implied. /d.
a.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The
JUry's Function To Make Credibility Determinations

The prosecutor engaged in impermissible vouching by stating that he believed
the victim and her story during closing arguments.

Prosecutors too often forget that

they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position,
which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give to
counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _ , 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The
prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only
competent evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the
jury.

/d. The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate

inferences. /d.
In Love/ass, the prosecutor informed the jury in closing argument that Lovelass
had committed "full-fledged perjury," that Lovelass had lied on more than one occasion,
and everything he said to the jury was fabricated. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160,
169 (Ct. App. 1999).

The Love/ass Court stated that in closing argument, "both the

prosecutor and defense counsel are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom," and that this
includes "the right to identify how, from the party's perspective, the evidence confirms or
calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses."
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/d. at 168, 983 P.2d at 241

(citation omitted). However, "it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief
or opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or as to the guilt of
the defendant." Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals held that the comments did
not constitute fundamental error as they appeared to have fallen within the broad range
of fair comment on the evidence rather than an expression of the prosecutor's personal
belief, but also recognized that the prosecutor's comments were troubling and less than
artful. Id. at 169. In State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496 (1999), even though the Idaho
Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statement that Hairston was a "murdering
dog" did not constitute fundamental error, the statement was criticized as "clearly
improper." Id. at 507, 988 P.2d at 1181. The Idaho Supreme Court cautioned that,
"[t]rial attorneys must avoid improper argument if the system is to work properly.

If

attorneys do not recognize improper argument and persist in its use, they should not be
members of The ... Sar." Id. at 508 (citing Luce v. State, 642 SO.2d 4 (Fla. Ct. App.
1994)).
Here, the prosecutor's complained of comments during closing argument were
not directed toward the evidence, or inferences drawn therefrom.

Instead, the

prosecutor expressed his opinion and belief that the alleged victim, S.H., was a credible
and truthful witness.

The prosecution's statements went much further than the

permissible bounds allowed to encourage a jury to question the credibility of witnesses.
The prosecutor committed misconduct when he stated the following:

"[S.H.] told you

about these behaviors, and she was honest with you. It's the state's position that

she has no impetus to lie, if she's willing to tell you what a tough kid she was."
(Tr.4/28/11 , p.187, LS.10-13 (emphasis added).) This comment was a direct statement

33

that the prosecutor, and all the official powers behind her position, believed that S.H.
was telling the truth, and is prosecutorial misconduct.
It is a violation of Mr. Frauenberger's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to
have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and
the law as explained in the jury instructions. In this case, misconduct related to
prosecutorial vouching interfered with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision,
thereby interfering with Mr. Frauenberger's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
As such, the misconduct in this case clearly violates Mr. Frauenberger's unwaived
constitutional rights and deprived him of his right to a fair trial. As such, this Court must
vacate the conviction.
b.

The Prosecution Committed Misconduct Sy Appealing To The
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury

During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following statements:
[S.H.] was pretty vulnerable to someone who wanted to get his own way
with her. She didn't have anybody really looking out for her.... The
defendant, was in a really good position to be able to prey on someone
who was wondering away from the herd, a really good position. Secause
let's look at it. How does a wolf decide on its prey? It looks for someone
who is weak. They could be old, could be sick, could be really young and
not have the physical strength to resist it. Looks for someone who's
wandering away from the herd, ignoring the safety in numbers that comes
with that, sneaking out, looking for greener grass someplace else or
maybe entertainment or diversion if you're a 13-year-old girl without
anybody watching out for you. Someone who's unaware of the danger
and unaware of what can happen with you sneak out in the middle of the
night with some boy, looking for maybe somebody who doesn't care about
the danger. So those conditions make that particular prey an easy target.
Here the prey was [S.H.]. What made here an easy target? Well, as I
said, most of the evidence that was heard from her, she was 13 years old
in the 8th grade. Talked about the family situation .... She didn't have any
guidance of an adult. And her testimony here, as you maybe saw, it
wasn't easy for her... She was so nervous that she peeled the skin off
her little finger while she was testifying Tuesday.
(TrAI28/11, p.187, L.14 - p.189, L.8.)
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· .. find the defendant guilty, because he is a predator. He preyed on
someone who was vulnerable and weak, and don't let that happen here in
our city, because [B.H.] doesn't have anything except the law that says
people under 16 don't have the capacity to consent. That's what she has
to protect her.
(TrA/28/11, p.198, Ls.13-18.)
The prosecutor's statements amounted to an improper plea for the jury to decide
this case based upon its fears, passions, and prejudices.

In United States v.

Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that such pleas are
wholly improper:

A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order
to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future
lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the
defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or
innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that,
convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing
social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a
burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear.
Id. at 1149 (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting
United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434,41 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). In Weatherspoon,
where the defendant was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm, portions of the prosecutor's closing argument focused on the personal comfort
and community safety which is attendant to taking armed ex-cons off the streets. Id. at
1149. The Ninth Circuit held that, "[t]hat entire line of argument ... was improper." Id.
Then, after quoting the above language from Koon and Monaghan, it observed that
since Mr. Weatherspoon's case turned solely on the question of whether he had, in fact,
been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the prosecutor's arguments
about the "potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a guilty verdict," were
"irrelevant and improper" because "[t]hey were clearly designed to encourage the jury to
enter a verdict on the basis of emotion rather than fact."
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Id. at 1149-50.

See also

v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 462-463 (2002) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the
prosecutor made a closing argument statement that was "a direct and unabashed
appeal for the jury to find the defendant guilty out of sympathy for the victim and his
family").
Because the prosecutor's statements in this case, much like the prosecutor's
pleas in Weatherspoon and Payne, were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a
guilty verdict based on its emotion and sympathy for B.H., rather than the facts of the
case,

they

were

irrelevant

and

improper

and

their

admission

violated

Mr. Frauenberger's rights to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction.
c.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Related To Encroaching Upon The
Jury's Function To Make Credibility Determinations And Appealing
To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury Is Reviewable As
Fundamental Error

First, it is a violation of Mr. Frauenberger's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair
trial to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at
trial and the law as explained in the jury instructions.

As such, prosecutorial

misconduct, in general, directly violates a constitutional right. It should be noted that the
Idaho Supreme Court stated in Perry that, "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a
verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the
evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair tria!."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court that
prosecutorial misconduct claims are connected to a constitutional provision.
In this case, the misconduct also interfered with the jury's ability to make an
impartial decision by personally vouching for a witness' credibility and clouding the
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issues with appeals to the passions and prejudices of the jury, thereby interfering with
Mr. Frauenberger's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.

The State violated

Mr. Frauenberger's right to a jury trial when the prosecutor attempted to encroach upon
the jury's vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence or lack of evidence
presented. ''The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment ... includes the
right to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of the testimony.'" State v. Elmore,
154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d
825, 838, 889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51, 60
P. 403 (1900)).
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Frauenberger's state and
federal constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional
rights to a jury trial. As such, the error is reviewable for fundamental error. The error in
this case plainly exists from the record and no additional information is necessary.
Further, it cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a
verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible grounds
presented through misconduct.
The prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction. In the case at
hand, this Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Frauenberger his right to a
fair trial because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not
contribute to the verdict. The case was not clear cut and was based solely upon the
jury's credibility determination of both S.H. and Mr. Frauenberger, as they were the only
individuals who may have witnessed or engaged in any inappropriate conduct because
no other witness was able to testify to observing anything more than seeing the two in
each others presence. Additionally, there was no physical evidence provided either of
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the alleged sexual contact or the existence or use of marijuana. In reviewing the trial as
a whole, the prosecutor's improper comments, constituting misconduct, may have
influenced the jury in this case. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction.
3.

Even If The Above Errors Are Harmless, The Accumulation Of The
Prosecutorial Misconduct Amounts To Cumulative Error

Mr. Frauenberger asserts that if the Court finds that the above prosecutorial
misconduct was harmless, the errors combined amount to cumulative error. "Under the
doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in
the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a necessary predicate to the
application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error." Perry, 150 Idaho at 230.
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that when ruling on a motion for mistrial
brought after an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the district court should
not limit its view of the misconduct to the specific isolated incident, but should also take
into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern of misbehavior.
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, _ , 253 P.3d 727, 744-45 (2011).

Mr. Frauenberger asserts that given the multiple instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, it is likely that even if each of the instances individually did not amount to
reversible error, the accumulation of the misconduct including the presentation of
vouching testimony, providing the jury with improper information, and appealing to the
passions and prejudices of the jury, influenced the jury and deprived Mr. Frauenberger
of his right to a fair trial.
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v.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Frauenberger,
Unified Sentences Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, For The Lewd Conduct
Charges, And Four Years, With One Year Fixed, For The Delivery Of Marijuana Charge,
To Be Served Concurrently
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences
of ten years, with two years fixed, for the lewd conduct charges, and four years, with
one year fixed, for the delivery of marijuana charge, to be served concurrently, are
excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an

excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of
the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771
(Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979». Mr. Frauenberger does not allege
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Frauenberger must show that in light of the governing criteria,
the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v.

Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown,

121 Idaho 385 (1992». The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v.
Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001».
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Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court
failed to give proper consideration to his young age and desire to become a successful,
contributing member of society as an adult. Mr. Frauenberger was only eighteen years
old when the instant offenses occurred. (PSI, pp.1-2.) The Idaho Supreme Court has
recognized a point first made by Justice Bistline in his dissent in State v. Adams, 99
Idaho 75 (1978), that in modifying sentences, the Court "has given great weight to the
age of a defendant."

Broadhead, 120 Idaho at 144 (citations omitted).

Further,

Mr. Frauenberger has completed his GED and attended a semester of college at the
College of Southern Idaho.

(PSI, p.7.) He has noted that he has goals for a better

future including "to be successful, have a good job, have an amazing family, [and] own
my own business." (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Frauenberger's young age and desire to have a
successful future counsels toward a less sever sentence.
Furthermore, Mr. Frauenberger has family support.

In State v. Shideler, 103

Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and friend support
were factors that should be considered in the Court's decision as to what is an
appropriate sentence. Id. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Frauenberger's father, noted
that he had done all he could to support his son, would be available as a source of help
to him if he were released, loved his son, and only wants the best for him. (Tr., p.399,
Ls.3-12.)
Prior to these offenses, Mr. Frauenberger has never been convicted of a felony.
(PSI, pp.3-5.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should
be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual crimina!." State v. Hoskins, 131
Idaho 670, 673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on
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other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The defendant in Hoskins pled guilty to two counts of drawing a
check without funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pled guilty to
the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both

Hoskins and Nice, the court considered, among other important factors, that the
defendants had no prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho
at 90. The Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense
and the absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its
discretion in imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675.
Although Mr. Frauenberger does have a history of juvenile and misdemeanor
convictions, the felony charges in this case are his only felony convictions. This fact
counsels toward a less sever punishment.
Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for
treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that
court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982), see also State v. Alberts,
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Frauenberger has admitted to prior occasional
alcohol use and prior marijuana use. (PSI, p.1 0.) At times, his marijuana use has been
as often as daily use.

(PSI, p.10.)

It was recommended that Mr. Frauenberger

participate in Level I Outpatient Treatment to address his substance abuse issues.
(PSI, p.11.)
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He
asserts that had the district court properly considered his young age, family support,
status as a first time felony offender, and substance abuse coupled with a need for
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treatment, it would have crafted a sentence that focused on his rehabilitation and future
potential in the community, rather than incarceration.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Frauenberger respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and
remand his case for further proceedings.

Alternatively, he requests that this Court

reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this

4th

day of May, 2012.
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